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 MICRO-CHIPPING AWAY AT PRIVACY:  PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS 
CREATED BY THE NEW QUEENSLAND DRIVER LICENCE PROPOSAL 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Queensland Transport plans to launch its ‘New Queensland Driver Licence’ 
Smartcard in 2008.1  The introduction will commence in November 2008 as a pilot 
with a complete rollout in July 2009.2 Delivery of the smartcard driver licence could 
be through a public-private partnership, with revenue earned through the partnership 
helping to offset the costs of the new driver licence. 3 The most recent media 
statement on the proposal, dated January 18 2007, confirmed that shortlisted bidders 
had been invited to submit binding bids for the development of the new licence.4  
This will make Queensland the first State in Australia to introduce a smartcard driver 
licence.   
 
Whilst Queensland Transport has specifically addressed issues of privacy in its 
Privacy Management Strategy5, the use of the smartcard technology will occur 
despite the absence of clear legislative protections including legal redress for 
information privacy.  The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its recent 
Review of Australian Privacy Law Discussion Paper (ALRC Discussion Paper) has 
identified the use of smartcards as raising significant privacy concerns including their 
lack of anonymity; their ability to collect vast amounts of information; and the ability 
to generate profiles.6  It is disappointing that Queensland has failed to implement the 
recommendations of the 1998 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative 
                                                 
1 Premier & Treasurer The Honourable Peter Beattie, ‘Smart Licence on the Cards’ (Ministerial Media 
Statement, Thursday, December 29, 2005). 
2 Queensland Transport, Invitation for Expression of Interest: New Queensland Driver Licence, Issued 
16 August 2006, EOI No. ISB086/06, Department of Public Works Queensland Government 
Marketplace website, 
<http://www.projectservices/qld.gov.au/eternderqgm/Tender.asp?TenderID=4764> at 10 September 
2006.  The EOI was removed on 2 October 2006.   
3 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper, September 
2003, 5. 
4 Queensland Government, Ministerial Media Statement, Minister for Transport & Main Roads, The 
Honourable Paul Lucas, Thursday, January 18 2007, ‘Government shortlists consortia for smartcard 
driver licence’, <http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=49949> 
at 10 January 2008. 
5 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 
6 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72,(2007) 
328–329. 
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 Review Committee’s Report on Privacy in Queensland7 that would have created 
adequate protections for privacy as a means of balancing the privacy concerns 
associated with smartcards.  This article considers the privacy implications associated 
with the NQDL Proposal particularly in the absence of state privacy legislation.  It 
concludes that information privacy legislation in Queensland is required as a matter of 
priority.   
 
II OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED ‘NEW QUEENSLAND DRIVER 
LICENCE’ PROPOSAL 
 
The New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal (NQDL Proposal) includes the 
smartcard that will be issued to licence-holders and the database that will support the 
smartcard.  The face of the NQDL Smartcard will contain the same information that 
currently appears on the driver licence.  A digital photograph will replace the current 
wet film photograph; applicants for the driver licence will also provide a digitised 
signature8.  The microchip of the driver licence will contain similar information that 
appears on the face of the driver licence.  A number of optional features are also 
proposed including the ability to store emergency contact details on the microchip; the 
capacity to perform secure online transactions; and access to commercial services 
such as loyalty schemes and an e-purse.  These services would be ‘partitioned’ 
separately from the Queensland Transport driver licensing functions.9   
 
Behind the smartcard technology of the driver licence itself, sits the Transport 
Registration and Integrated Licensing System Database, known as ‘TRAILS’.  The 
power to establish the TRAILS database is provided under the Transport Operations 
(Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld).  Personal information stored on TRAILS 
will include the digital photograph and the digitised signature, and the licensing 
information. This information will be encrypted. 10  The database will not include the 
                                                 
7 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Privacy in Queensland, 
Report no 9 (1998) 
8 The consultation material on the NQDL refers to a ‘digital signature’, that is the use of public key 
technology that applies an algorithm to encrypt a message.  However, the NQDL will use a ‘digitised 
signature’ – a signature that has been scanned into a computer. 
9 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper (2003) 3-5. 
10 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 3. 
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 emergency contact details.11  The NQDL: Consultation Paper does not specify if the 
licence holder’s traffic offence history would be stored on TRAILS or on the 
microchip.    
 
III OVERVIEW OF SMARTCARD TECHNOLOGY 
 
Smartcard driver licences have been introduced in Argentina, China, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Guatemala, India, Malaysia and Mexico.12  In Australia, no other state or 
territory has (as yet) introduced smartcard technology to administer a driver licence; 
however it is likely that if Queensland is successful in its implementation of smartcard 
technology, then other states and territories will follow suit.  This conclusion may be 
supported by Austroad’s13 preparation of a discussion paper in which it provided an 
interoperability protocol14 in which the development of ‘a national approach to the 
deployment of smartcard-based driver licences in Australia’ is discussed.  Queensland 
and other states already participate in an arrangement enabling the exchange of driver 
licensing and registration details under the National Exchange of Vehicle and Driver 
Information System (NEVDIS), authorised in Queensland by the Transport 
Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999.15
 
Smartcards have a number of features that make them useful as a means of data 
transmission and data storage.  Firstly, smartcards contain an embedded microchip 
that can transmit data either through direct contact with a smartcard reader, in which 
case the smartcard is known as a contact card, or by being activated through the use of 
high frequency radio waves that can be transmitted from the card to a transmitter 
within range.  This latter type of card, known as contactless, has been used mostly for 
                                                 
11 Ibid 8.   
12 VicRoads, Introducing New Driver Licence Card Technologies: A Smarter Licence for Victorians 
(2002) 9. 
13 Austroads is the association of Australian and New Zealand Governments road transport and traffic 
authorities.  Austroads members are the six Australian state and two territory road transport and traffic 
authorities, the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services, the Australian Local 
Government Association and Transit New Zealand. 
14 Austroads, Smartcard Licence Interoperability Protocol (SLIP): A flexible approach to driver 
licensing into the future, Discussion Paper (2005) 3. 
15 Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999 
(Qld),Division 5. 
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 high speed or large volume applications, for example, tollways.   The NQDL 
Smartcard will be a contact smartcard.16
 
The second feature of a smartcard that makes it useful is that the smartcard chip may 
be comprised of partitioned data storage areas or memory facilities.  Each of the 
components can be accessed by different parties involved in the use of the smartcard.  
This allows the smartcard to be used as a platform to support a number of commercial 
and government functions.  ‘Both types of smartcards offer true multi-functionality. 
The storage and processing capacities of smartcards are impressive, and it is not 
unusual to find a smartcard that is capable of performing up to fifty different 
functions.’17
 
With respect to the NQDL Smartcard, information is partitioned to provide for an 
‘open’ part of the chip which contains details of the card holder (name and address); 
this can be read by anyone with access to a suitable card reader, although the 
information cannot be overwritten.  The ‘working’ component of the chip contains 
information that is specifically about the card holder such as the person’s driver 
licensing information.  The ‘secret’ part of the chip contains information that cannot 
be accessed by the card holder without the use of a personal identification number or 
password.  The ‘super secret’ part of the chip contains information and programs 
placed there by the chip manufacturer and/or the issuer of the card.  This area can 
only be accessed by the chip manufacturer.18
 
Queensland Transport foreshadowed using smartcards for driver licences in its 
submission to the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee Report 
on Privacy in Queensland.  In its submission, dated 28 July 1997, Queensland 
Transport stated that ‘the possibilities for smartcards are enormous; for example, 
Queensland Transport is evaluating the possibility of using smartcards as a future 
replacement for drivers licences in Queensland.’19
                                                 
16 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper (2003) 9. 
17 Privacy Committee of New South Wales, Smart Cards: Brother’s Little Helpers, Report, No 66 
(1995) 7. 
18 Federal Privacy Commissioner, Smart cards: Implications for privacy, Information Paper No 4 
(1995) 7. 
19 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Privacy in Queensland, 
Report No 9 (1998) 193. 
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There are also disadvantages associated with smartcard technology that have not been 
addressed within the policy documents used to advance the NQDL Proposal.  The 
Australian Government Smartcard Framework, Smartcard Handbook20 has identified 
major security vulnerabilities including direct probing by scanning an electron 
microscope over the smartcard to reveal its memory contents; ‘side channel’ attacks, 
which have been the subject of much academic and private sector research; crypto 
analysis; and quantum computing.  A Sydney University engineering student has 
‘…demonstrated a smartcard attack for his final year thesis, using a method called 
‘differential power analyses’.  Using software he developed and a cathode ray 
oscilloscope [the student] showed that cards using Data Encryption Standard…. could 
be interrogated to reveal secret information such as keys and [personal identification 
number]’.21   
 
One of the key objectives put forward by Queensland Transport for using smartcard 
technology in the NQDL Proposal is its ability to reduce the issue of fraudulent driver 
licences.22 This objective might not so easily be achieved given the demonstrations of 
vulnerabilities associated with the technology.  Of Queensland Transport plans to 
launch its ‘New Queensland Driver Licence’ Smartcard in 2008.  The introduction 
will commence in November 2008 as a pilot with a complete rollout in July 2009. 
Delivery of the smartcard driver licence could be through a public-private partnership, 
with revenue earned through the partnership helping to offset the costs of the new 
driver licence. The most recent media statement on the proposal, dated January 18 
2007, confirmed that shortlisted bidders had been invited to submit binding bids for 
the development of the new licence.  This will make Queensland the first State in 
Australia to introduce a smartcard driver licence.   
 
Whilst Queensland Transport has specifically addressed issues of privacy in its 
Privacy Management Strategy, the use of the smartcard technology will occur despite 
the absence of clear legislative protections including legal redress for information 
privacy.  The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its recent Review of 
                                                 
20 Australian Government Information Management Office, Smartcard Handbook (2006) B2. 
21 Electronic Frontiers Australia, Queensland Smart Card Driver Licence Proposal (2003) 4. 
22 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper (2003) 9-10. 
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 Australian Privacy Law Discussion Paper (ALRC Discussion Paper) has identified 
the use of smartcards as raising significant privacy concerns including their lack of 
anonymity; their ability to collect vast amounts of information; and the ability to 
generate profiles.  It is disappointing that Queensland has failed to implement the 
recommendations of the 1998 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative 
Review Committee’s Report on Privacy in Queensland that would have created 
adequate protections for privacy as a means of balancing the privacy concerns 
associated with smartcards.  This article considers the privacy implications associated 
with the NQDL Proposal particularly in the absence of state privacy legislation.  It 
concludes that information privacy legislation in Queensland is required as a matter of 
priority.  Of course, the counter-argument is that, to date, no technology is absolutely 
impenetrable. 
 
IV INTEROPERABILITY OF SMARTCARDS 
 
The concept of ‘interoperability’ is a key feature of smartcards.  Already the 
Australian Government, in its Smartcard Framework, Responsive Government: A 
New Service Agenda,23 has anticipated the Queensland Government’s proposed 
NQDL Proposal in which all licensed road users’ information (personal information, 
road traffic information, criminal records) will be linked into the Australian 
Government’s Smartcard Framework.  The Australian Government is anticipating the 
development of a coordinated network of smartcards potentially through all levels of 
government (local, state and federal) and out into commercial organisations.  The 
Smartcard Framework is intended ‘to facilitate clear thinking about implementation 
issues… to help agencies understand the business case for smartcards, and to promote 
standardisation and uniformity for the shared benefit of all government agencies.’24 
‘Shared benefit’ has the potential to lead to ‘function creep’ through breaches of, or 
exceptions to, the information privacy principles that protect collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information. 
                                                 
23 Australian Government Information Management Office, Australian Government Smartcard 
Framework: Responsive Government – A New Service Agenda Part A (2006) 8.  The set of documents 
is established by the Australian Government Information Management Office June 2006 (the 
‘Smartcard Framework ’).  The Smartcard Framework is intended ‘to facilitate clear thinking about 
implementation issues… to help agencies understand the business case for smartcards, and to promote 
standardisation and uniformity for the shared benefit of all government agencies.’  
24 Ibid 8. 
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V OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION 
 
The regulation of information privacy in Australia is regulated under a number of 
regimes including the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) which has application 
for Commonwealth agencies and the private sector.  Information privacy in 
Queensland is regulated by Information Standard 42: Information Privacy and 
Guidelines, (IS42) an administrative decision of the Queensland Cabinet (made on 13 
September 2001) and applying to Queensland State agencies.25  It applies neither to 
the private sector, nor to local government.26  
 
The ALRC Discussion Paper has commented that ‘Australian privacy laws are multi-
layered, fragmented and inconsistent.’27  The Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Reference Committee inquiry, The Real Big Brother: Inquiry into the Privacy Act 
1988 (2005) noted that ‘[t]his inconsistency occurs across Commonwealth legislation, 
between Commonwealth and state and territory legislation, and between the public 
and private sectors.’28 For example, the Privacy Act does not apply to states or 
territories, yet it does apply to state instrumentalities (state business enterprises).29
 
There is further inconsistency in the comparison of regulation of privacy between 
Queensland, and other states and territories.  Some other jurisdictions throughout 
Australia30 have introduced legislation to protect information privacy, including New 
                                                 
25 Queensland Government Information Architecture, Information Standard 4: Information Privacy 
Guidelines (2001). 
26 Health information is regulated by Information Standard 42A. 
27 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 (2007) 
236. 
28 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 
(2007), 236 quoting the Parliament of Australia - Senate Legal & Constitutional Reference Committee, 
The Real Big Brother: Inquiry into the Privacy Act 1988 (2005) [7.6].  
29 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 6C(4) & 6F.  The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner provides 
further information on the complexities of the obligations upon Commonwealth contractors in its 
Information Sheet 14 – 2001:  Privacy Obligations for Commonwealth Contractors, Federal Privacy 
Commissioner’s website, < http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/IS14_01_print.html>, at 14 
January 2008. 
30 New South Wales has the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) which 
makes provisions for Information Privacy Principles (Part 2); Privacy codes of practices and 
management plans (Part 3); Privacy Commissioner (Part 4); and a Privacy Advisory Committee (Part 
7).  Victoria has the Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) which makes provision for: Information 
Privacy Principles (Part 3); Codes of practice (Part 4); and a Privacy Commissioner (Part 7).  The 
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 South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, and 
Tasmania.   Western Australia has prepared an Information Privacy Bill 2007, which 
to date has not yet been passed.  South Australia, the only other state reliant upon an 
administrative approach, at least provides support for the administrative regime with a 
Privacy Committee proclaimed in 2001.31    
 
VI PRIVACY ACT 1988 (CTH) 
 
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) was passed ‘to make provision to protect the privacy of 
individual, and for related purposes’.  The Privacy Act, however, protects only 
‘information privacy’.  The Privacy Act seeks to achieve this for the Commonwealth 
public sector through the establishment of eleven Information Privacy Principles32.   
The Information Privacy Principles (‘IPPs’) relate to collection and use of data (IPPs 
1, 2, 3, 9, 10 and 11); storage and security of data (IPPs 4, 5 and 6); and accuracy of 
data (IPPs 7 and 8).  The principles apply to ‘personal information’ in a ‘record’.   
 
‘Personal information’ is defined33 as ‘information or an opinion (including 
information or an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or not, and 
whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is 
apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.’  
‘Sensitive information’ means information or an opinion about an individual’s racial 
or ethnic origin; political opinions or associations; religious or philosophical beliefs; 
membership of a trade union; sexual preferences; or criminal record.  It also includes 
health and genetic information about an individual.34 ‘Record’ means a document, 
database (however kept) or a photograph or other pictorial representation of a 
person’.35   
 
                                                                                                                                            
Australian Capital Territory has the Information Privacy Act 2000 (ACT) and the Northern Territory 
has the Information Act 2004 (NT).  Tasmania has the Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas).   
31 Cabinet Administrative Instruction 1/89 dealing with information privacy.  The Privacy Committee 
was proclaimed in 2001. 
32 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s14. 
33 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s6. 
34 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s6. 
35 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s6. 
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 The TRAILS database and the digital photograph of the NQDL-holder on the NQDL 
Smartcard could be within the definitions of ‘personal information’ and possibly 
‘sensitive information’ (that is if the definitions in the Privacy Act apply to 
Queensland agencies under IS42, which is discussed below). 
 
The Biometrics Institute (as cited in the ALRC’s Discussion Paper) states in its Code 
that ‘a photograph could be described as one of the lower levels of biometric 
recognition’.36  The ALRC Discussion Paper stated that ‘sensitive information should 
be amended to include certain biometric information… It is very personal because it 
is information about an individual’s physical self. [And] can reveal other sensitive 
information, such as health or genetic information and racial or ethnic origin.  [It] can 
provide the basis for unjustified discrimination.’37  The privacy implications 
associated with the NQDL Smartcard digital photograph, and the sensitive 
information it can reveal becomes more significant in relation to access to the 
photograph by Queensland Police Service (see the discussion below). 
VII INFORMATION STANDARD 42 – INFORMATION PRIVACY 
 
The regulation of privacy for government agencies in Queensland (with the exception 
of health information) is through Queensland Information Standard 42: Information 
Privacy and Guidelines (IS42).38  The principles identified in IS42 are based on the 
11 IPPs in the Privacy Act.  It is unclear as to whether or not the definitions of the 
Privacy Act have been imported into IS42.  For example, the information standard 
provides similar definitions to the Privacy Act for ‘personal information’ and for an 
‘individual’, however there is no definition of ‘sensitive information’, merely the 
inclusion of the statement that ‘[c]ollecting personal information will be intrusive if it 
involves: asking questions about sensitive personal affairs; for example, a person’s 
medical history, their sexual preferences, their personal finances, their political 
persuasion…’39
 
                                                 
 36 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72
(2007), 211 quoting Biometrics Institute, Biometrics Institute Privacy Code Information Memorandum 
(2006), 1. 
37 Ibid 213-214. 
38 Queensland Government Information Architecture, Information Standard 4: Information Privacy 
Guidelines (2001). 
39 Ibid 29. 
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 The standard is administrative with limited enforcement available through a series of 
codes of conduct, privacy plans and disciplinary actions offered through the Public 
Sector Ethics Act 1994, the Public Service Act 1996 and the Financial Administration 
and Audit Act 1977.  
 
The information privacy regime available in Queensland is disappointing given the 
comprehensive review of privacy undertaken by the Queensland Legal, Constitutional 
and Administrative Review Committee in 1998, in which that Committee gave serious 
consideration to matters such as:  What is privacy, why should it be protected, how is 
privacy is currently protected in Queensland in terms of information privacy in the 
public sector and in the private sector. 
 
In its conclusion, the Legal Constitutional and Administrative Committee made 32 
recommendations40, including: That a Queensland Privacy Commissioner or 
Committee be established by legislation, the Privacy Act (Qld)41; that the Information 
Privacy Principles applicable to Queensland government departments and agencies be 
implemented in legislation and not by cabinet administrative instructions;42 that the 
functions of the Queensland Privacy Commissioner should not be combined with any 
other office;43 that the Privacy Act (Qld) should apply to private service-providers 
contracted by Queensland government departments and agencies to perform services 
which would otherwise be performed by those departments or agencies;44 that a 
number of privacy issues arise from the use of smartcards and that the Queensland 
Privacy Commissioner conduct an audit to establish the use or intended use of 
smartcards.45  
 
To date, none of these recommendations made by the Queensland Legal, 
Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee have been implemented.  
Indeed in many instances successive Queensland governments have implemented a 
                                                 
40 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Privacy in Queensland, 
Report no 9 (1998) XII–XXI. 
41 Ibid 48.  In 1999 an Information Privacy Bill was introduced into Queensland Parliament, but not 
passed. 
42 Ibid 59. 
43 Ibid 119.  
44 Ibid 132. 
45 Ibid 198. 
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 privacy regime that directly conflicts with the recommendations.  For example 
information privacy principles have been implemented by cabinet administrative 
instructions rather than through legislation; the proposed NQDL Proposal will utilise 
the already over extended Ombudsman’s Office46 as a means of providing external 
privacy oversight;  Queensland Transport has undertaken an audit of its datasets as 
part of its Privacy Plan,47 however this remains incomplete in significant areas,48; and 
a smartcard specific audit has not been conducted by government departments.      
 
VIII APPLICATION OF INFORMATION STANDARD 42 TO  
THE NQDL PROPOSAL 
 
The analysis of the proposed NQDL Proposal in this article is dealt with in terms of 
asking ‘is the NQDL compliant with the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) in IS 
42?’   In particular, compliance is considered in terms of the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information.     
 
IX COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 
 
IPP 1 requires that personal information shall not be collected unless it is for a lawful 
purpose directly related to a function or activity; also, the collection must not be by 
unlawful or unfair means.  The ALRC Discussion Paper has stated that ‘the Privacy 
Commissioner has expressed the view that ‘purpose of collection’ is to be interpreted 
narrowly, and that agencies should have a clear purpose for collecting each piece of 
personal information. It is not generally acceptable for an agency to collect 
information just because it may be useful in the future.’49   
 
                                                 
46 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy,(2003) 13.  
‘The Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) has broad powers of investigation and these 
powers would extend to investigations of matters relating to Queensland Transport’s data management 
practices. 
47 Queensland Transport, Privacy Plan – Information Privacy (2006) Appendix B. 
48 The incompleteness of the Queensland Transport dataset audit (in the Queensland Transport Privacy 
Plan: Information Privacy, December 2004)  was revealed through a cross-referenced check with the 
Queensland Police Service dataset audit (in the Queensland Police Service Information Privacy Plan, 
20 July 2004.   
49 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 
(2007) 600 referring to the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Plain English Guidelines to 
Information Privacy Principle, 1–3: Advice to Agencies about Collecting Personal Information (1994). 
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 Queensland Transport currently has the legislative authority to collect information for 
the purposes of maintaining a licensing database under the Transport Operations 
(Road Use Management) Act 1995(Qld).50 Queensland Transport is proposing an 
additional ‘purpose’ provision to be included under this Act, ‘that would include a 
clear definition of the circumstances for collecting driver licensing information.’51 
The inclusion of a ‘purpose’ provision; the details of its breadth; and any offences 
attaching will be a critical element in ensuring the protection of personal information.  
The provision would provide a legislative basis to enable an aggrieved NQDL-holder 
to challenge such collection of personal information as being ultra vires and beyond 
the statutory purposes under administrative law.  To date, however, Queensland 
Transport has not provided a draft of the ‘purpose’ provision, nor any outline as to its 
possible content for public comment.  
 
 
 
X USE & DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON THE NQDL 
 
IPP 10 provides for limits on the use of personal information; and IPP 11 provides for 
limits on the disclosure of personal information.  Both IPPs provide for circumstances 
in which use and disclosure may occur, including that the individual was reasonably 
likely to have been aware the information would be so disclosed; the individual 
consented; it was authorised by law; or it was reasonably necessary for enforcement 
of the criminal law.    
 
The NQDL Proposal provides for a number of uses and disclosures of personal 
information including to: Queensland Transport licensing staff and authorised 
officers; interstate licensing authorities; and the Queensland Police Service.  
Disclosure to Emergency Service officers is on a voluntary basis and so would be 
within the consent and/or ‘reasonably aware’ exceptions.  Disclosure to commercial 
operators involves an analysis of the contracts under the public-private partnership in 
                                                 
50 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 3(a) provides that ‘This Act 
establishes a scheme to allow identification of vehicles, drivers and road users’.  S150 (1)(d) provides 
that, ‘A regulation may prescribe rules about the management of drivers, including for example 
requiring the keeping of a register of licences.’ 
51 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 3. 
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 terms of the National Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act.  This analysis raises 
issues similar to the collection, use and disclosure of personal and sensitive 
information already discussed.  However, the statutory protections under the Privacy 
Act would most likely offer greater privacy protections, and clearer avenues of redress 
than is currently available to a NQDL-licence holder under Information Standard 
No.42, a mere administrative standard.  However, there are also other, more 
fundamental issues associated with contracting out of government services in which 
there is a ‘‘privatising’ of the relationship between the service providers and members 
of the public, which has the potential to result in a loss for individuals of the benefits 
of administrative law’52(for example, rights under the Freedom of Information Act 
1992 (Qld), and accountabilities of government under the Financial Administration 
and Audit Act 1977 (Qld)).  Potentially there is also the loss of ministerial 
responsibility and Parliamentary scrutiny.53  
 
 
XI QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT LICENSING STAFF 
 
The NQDL Privacy Management Strategy54 provides that access to a licence-holder’s 
personal information may be granted to authorised people including Queensland 
Transport licensing staff who will have access to licensing information on the 
microchip and the TRAILS database.  The Transport Operations (Road Use 
Management) Act 1995 already provides legislative authority for access to a driver 
licence-holder’s personal information.  For example, section 49(1) provides that ‘an 
authorised officer may require a person to produce for inspection a document issued, 
or required to be kept, under a transport Act’; this includes officers and employees of 
the public service who have been appointed by the chief executive.55  The breadth of 
this group of people includes transport compliance officers, administration officers, 
                                                 
52 Gregorczuk H, ‘Freedom of Information: Government Owned Corporations, Contractors and 
Cabinet Exemptions’ Research Bulletin No5/99, Queensland Parliamentary Library (1999), citing Hon 
Justice EW Thomas, ‘Secrecy and Open Government’, in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Law and 
Government,: Principles and Values, Vol 1 (1995) 182-227, 184. 
53 Administrative Review Council, Report to the Attorney-General, The Contracting Out of 
Government Services, Australian Commonwealth Government, (1998) vii. 
54 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy, (2003) 8.   
55 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 20, provides for the appointment of 
authorised officers, which includes ‘every police officer’.  Schedule 4 of the Act defines ‘authorised 
officer’ to mean ‘a person who holds an appointment as an authorised officer under s 20.’ 
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 and police officers.  The exceptions allowing disclosure in IPP 11 may serve to 
authorise the disclosure either because the individual would have been reasonably 
likely to have been aware of that kind of disclosure; or because it was authorised by 
law.  However, if these exceptions are not sufficient to authorise the disclosure, then it 
may be that the ‘consent’ of the individual is required.   
 
The Privacy Act defines ‘consent’ to mean ‘express consent or implied consent’.56  
The ALRC Discussion Paper stated that its view on ‘consent’ is that, taking into 
account of ‘how consent has been interpreted in Australia and overseas… there are 
four critical factors that apply…’57 they are: the context in which the consent is 
sought; whether there is informed consent; whether the consent is voluntary; and 
whether the individual’s option to consent to one purpose is freely available and not 
bundled with other purposes.58IS42 does not define ‘consent’, nor does it make any 
statement as to whether the definition of ‘consent’ from the Privacy Act is to be used.  
However, in the IS42 Information Privacy Guidelines59 there is an explanatory 
discussion on ‘consent’ that provides ‘[t]he agency can safely use or disclose personal 
information under these exceptions if the person the information is about clearly 
understands the use or disclosure they are consenting to, and they are not forced to 
consent.’  (My underlining). 
 
The NQDL consultation materials do not provide sufficient information or detail in 
order for an individual or prospective NQDL-holder to provide ‘informed consent’ or 
‘voluntary consent’.  To satisfy IPP 11, full details on the intended disclosure of 
information to any other person, including licensing staff and legislatively authorised 
officers must be documented and made available for consideration, for example, as 
part of the licence application forms.  
 
                                                 
56 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s6.  
57 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 
(2007) 578-579. 
58 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 
(2007) 578-579. 
59 Information Standard 42: Information Privacy Guidelines, V1.00.00 Queensland Government 
Information Architecture, 40 
<http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:fuJGz0mHntwJ:www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/02_infostand/download
s/is42guidelines.pdf+information+standard+42&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=5>  at 10 September 2007. 
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 One of the few means of legal redress for an unauthorised disclosure is provided for 
in section 143(1), Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995.  This 
section provides that ‘a person must not disclose, record or use information that the 
person gained through involvement in the administration of this Act, or because of an 
opportunity provided by the involvement.’  This would apply to Queensland 
Transport staff accessing driver licensing information, binding them to confidentiality 
in their dealings with that information.  The effectiveness of this provision may be 
reduced if an individual (whose information is disclosed) is not made aware of the 
disclosure.   
 
XII INTERSTATE LICENSING AUTHORITIES 
 
Queensland Transport currently has the power to release driver licence information 
and traffic offence histories without the consent of the licence holder.  Section 77, 
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 provides for both the release 
of this information in circumstances requiring the written consent of the licence-
holder, and also the power of the chief executive to release information, without 
consent, about a person’s Queensland driver licence or traffic offence history to a 
person who issues driver licences under a corresponding law.     
 
The exchange of information is provided by the Transport Operations (Road Use 
Management – Vehicle Registration) Regulation 1999 the (TO(RUM–VR) 
Regulation).  In addition the (TO(RUM–VR) Regulation allows ‘eligible people’ and 
‘involved people’ to obtain limited amounts of information in the form of certificates, 
and also provides for the ‘National Exchange of Vehicle and Driver Information 
System’ (NEVDIS).  This system is operated under an arrangement with Queensland 
and other states that allows exchange of information about vehicles and drivers from 
the participating states.  It is unlikely that this ‘exchange’ would be a breach of IPP 11 
(or IPP 10 – limits on use of personal information) because IS42, as an administrative 
standard would not take priority over legislation or contractual arrangement.    
 
This section would clearly include releasing the information for example, to the 
Victorian Department of Transport.  The section also authorises ‘an entity that, under 
an agreement between the State and other governments, maintains a database 
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 containing information about driver licences and traffic histories’ as being able to 
have access.  Neither the NQDL: Consultation Paper nor the NQDL Privacy 
Management Strategy deal with the power to release information under TO(RUM–VR) 
Regulation.   
 
There are examples of government organisations using personal information from 
databases for ‘inappropriate purposes’, for example, the New South Wales 
Ombudsman’s report has on a number of occasions cited New South Wales police 
officers accessing databases inappropriately despite a code of practice60 and UK 
driver licensing authorities have admitted selling information about vehicle licence 
owners to private companies.61   
 
 
 
XIII ACCESS BY THE NQDL-HOLDER 
 
The NQDL Proposal62 includes the optional feature of offering secure online 
transactions to the NQDL-holder through the use of digital certificates.  This feature 
will enable NQDL-holders to have access to license information details with the 
ability to update certain information including change of address details, via the 
smartcard partition relating to this information.  Access to personal information and 
requirements for accuracy is provided for by IPPs 5, 6, 7 and 8.  IPP 5 requires a 
record-keeper to provide an individual with information about their records; IPP 6 
provides the individual with access to their own records; IPPs 7 and 8 require that the 
record it to be accurate, related to the purpose, up to date, complete and not 
misleading.  The inclusion of the optional feature would be consistent with the 
information privacy principles. 
 
XIV USE & DISCLOSURE TO QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE 
 
                                                 
60 Greenleaf Graham, ‘Ombudsman – Police still lax on disclosure, NSW Ombudsman Annual Report’ 
(1994) 1(9) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, 134, 175 
61 Stand, Entitlement cards and identity fraud: Identity Card Response, 
<http://www.stand.org.uk/IdCardResponse.html> at 20 April 2006. 
62 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper (2003) 18 
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 Under the NQDL Proposal, Queensland Transport are proposing two options to allow 
‘access by law enforcement and other government agencies’63to the digital 
photographs stored on the TRAILS database.  Option A would allow ‘access to 
photographs by law enforcement personnel and interstate licensing authorities’64  This 
option includes the following ‘protection measures: encryption of the photographs 
upon transfer and for storage; no storage of identifying personal information with the 
photograph; no data matching; and no ability to browse photographs’.  Option A also 
provides clear limits on the circumstances in which the licensing authorities and law 
enforcement could access the photographs that relate to the investigations of 
fraudulent driver licences, criminal investigations under the Transport Operations 
(Road Use Management) Act 1995, or a court order or warrant ‘specifically requesting 
release of a named licence holder’s photograph’.65  
 
In contrast, Option B provides a general statement that ‘licence holders would be 
advised prior to applying for a licence that law enforcement personnel would have 
access to their photographs in much the same way they currently have access to other 
driving licensing information’.66 This option allows ‘law enforcement personnel to 
access digital photographs for law enforcement purposes, subject to clear 
accountability processes.  Some of these purposes might include locating missing 
persons, identifying deceased persons involved in major accidents and their next of 
kin, executing warrants and serving other legal processes.’67 There are significant 
privacy implications regarding this option.  The broad use of the digital photograph 
for purposes unrelated to its collection would inevitably lead to ‘function creep’, that 
is the use of the TRAILS database for purposes for which it was not originally 
contemplated.  The ALRC in its Discussion Paper included similar comments with 
respect to the Commonwealth Health and Social Services Access Card68 that required 
a digital photograph as part of registration.  The ALRC Discussion Paper included 
                                                 
63 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 4. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 5.  
67 Ibid.  
68 The Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007 (Cth) was passed by the House of 
Representatives on 28 February, and then introduced into the Senate on the same day, was adjourned 
and later withdrawn that same day. 
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 comments that ‘photographs of cardholders collected at the time of registration could 
later be used to identify people on Closed Circuit Television footage.’ 69  
 
It is arguable that both Option A and Option B would be in breach of IS42, with 
respect to Information Privacy Principle 1, and the existing ‘function provision’ of the 
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 because the personal 
information (the digital photograph) has been collected for the purpose of maintaining 
a driver licence register; the information has not been collected for the purpose of 
general law enforcement provisions.  However, it is possible for Queensland 
Transport to establish that the information is necessary for one of its statutorily 
authorised purposes; in which case the subsequent use and disclosure (by Queensland 
Police Service) must be in compliance with IPP’s 10 and 11. Although the Transport 
Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (sections 77 and 143) authorise access 
to driver licensing information to police officers, this authorisation is statutorily 
limited to transport related investigations.   
 
Option A includes some limits on access to personal information, whilst Option B is 
drafted broadly in terms of access for ‘law enforcement provisions’.  Under Option B, 
Queensland Transport could be in breach of the confidentiality provisions of 
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 section 77 (dealing with 
release of information from TRAILS), and section 143 (statutory duty of 
confidentiality), as well as breaches under IS42, under IPP 9 (personal information to 
be used for relevant purposes); IPP 10 (limits on use); and IPP 11 (limits on 
disclosure) by allowing Queensland Police Service access to personal information.     
 
Under the options, the rationale for the disclosure on the basis of identification at an 
accident scene appears superfluous given the ability for a prospective NQDL-holder 
to be able to choose to provide emergency contact details that would specifically 
cover the circumstances for which the identification of a person at a major accident 
scene may be required.   
 
                                                 
69 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 
(2007), 803 quoting A Stafford, ‘Access Card Could Link to Surveillance’, The Age (Melbourne), 5 
June 2006 9. 
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 Both of the options raise privacy issues: Queensland Police Service currently have the 
ability to access licensing information with respect to licensing or transport related 
investigations; why is it necessary for a licence-holder to give broad consent?  What 
right would a licence-holder have to refuse to give that consent and still be able to 
obtain a licence, and have a guarantee that their photograph would not be accessed?  
The prospective NQDL-holder will have provided their personal information in the 
form of a digital photograph for the express purpose of enabling Queensland 
Transport to maintain a driver licence register.  There is an element of compulsion in 
providing this personal information if a person chooses to drive a vehicle in 
Queensland.     
 
Option A provides some clear guidance as to the circumstances in which the 
photographs will be released, and both options provide ‘protection measures’,70 
including:  informing licence holders of their privacy rights; secure logins and use of 
trigger alarms for unauthorised access; maintaining and auditing transaction logs of 
licence photographs; conducting privacy training for relevant staff; promoting the 
availability of a privacy complaints resolution process; and enforcing penalties for 
improper use and disclosure.  The use of technological (encryption and logins) and 
administrative (training and provision of information) means of protecting privacy 
need to occur within a context of providing a clear legislative right to the protection of 
information privacy.  Although the NQDL Proposal states that penalties for improper 
use and disclosure will occur, within the current information privacy regime, this may 
not be effective (see the later discussion). 
 
The protection measures are certainly appropriate to satisfy security measures and IPP 
4; however, such measures are not to be confused with ensuring protection of the 
remaining IPPs dealing with use and disclosure.  It is possible to breach information 
privacy through its use and disclosure, even though the personal information was 
stored in accordance with the principle relevant to security.   
 
XV ACCURACY OF THE DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH ON THE  
TRAILS DATABASE 
                                                 
70 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence Proposal: Consultation Paper (2003) 8.  
 
    
19
  
Both Information Privacy Principles 7 and 8 require that reasonable steps in the 
circumstances be taken to ensure that personal information collected must be relevant, 
up-to-date, complete and accurate.  The requirement of ‘accuracy’ of the database will 
raise information privacy issues under the proposed NQDL.  Queensland Transport 
may experience technical difficulties in complying with the information privacy 
principles.  For Queensland Transport to ensure the accuracy (or integrity as it is 
referred to by the consultation documentation) of the digital photographs, it will need 
to ensure that the database does not contain duplicate photographs, which are false 
identity photographs.  Computer programs are available to scan through the database 
and identify where possible duplicates exist, however, research71 conducted on such a 
program indicates that as the database size increases, the performance of the 
technology decreases by a significant percentage.  The result is that the program may 
either falsely detect duplicate photographs, or fail to detect where the same person has 
been placed two (or more times) on the database.  In terms of the proposed NQDL, it 
may mean that the database may still allow false driver licences to be issued by 
Queensland Transport; or that a genuine driver licence is wrongly asserted to be a 
false driver licence.   
 
The inability to ensure the integrity of the digital photographs on the database will 
raise additional information privacy concerns if the Queensland Police Service relies 
upon the database for general ‘law enforcement’ functions.  The standard of the IPP 
requires only that ‘reasonable steps be taken’ rather than requiring absolute accuracy. 
  
XVI ENFORCEMENT ISSUES  
 
The NQDL Privacy Management Strategy iprovides that sanctions and remedies are 
in place under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld).  
Indeed a statutory confidentiality provision exists under this Act; 72  however, there is 
no penalty provided under the State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2000 (Qld) 
regarding breach of this provision.   
                                                 
71 Phillips Jonathon, Grother Patrick, Micheals Ross, Blackburn Duane, Tabassi Elham, Bone Mike, 
‘Face Recognition Vendor Test 2002, Overview and Summary’ (2003) National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2-3.  
72 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) ss77 & 143. 
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There are major difficulties in enforcing the information privacy principles under 
IS42 primarily because IS42 is only an administrative standard that can be superseded 
by legislative provisions or contractual clauses to the contrary. A further impediment 
is the scattered and complex nature of the administrative avenues for redress offered 
by the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994; Public Service Act 1996; and the Financial 
Administration and Audit Act 1977.    
 
Finally, the remedies for breach of an individual’s personal information are 
inappropriate. These matters are discussed in terms of accountabilities for breach by 
members of the public sector, with the focus on the Queensland Police Service, and 
Queensland Transport.  
 XVII ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The NQDL: Privacy Management Strategy states73 that accountability for breach of 
information privacy by members of the Queensland Police Service is in the Police 
Service Administration Act 1990, in which the offence of ‘improper disclosure of 
information’ is created.  The offence incurs a monetary penalty which may not be an 
appropriate remedy to a NQDL-holder whose personal information has been disclosed 
improperly.  It would be far more appropriate to establish penalties that address the 
subsequent loss of personal information privacy to the NQDL-holder as well as 
operate to deter the action of improper disclosure.   
 
The enforcement of IS42 is through the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994; Public Service 
Act 1996; and the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977.   The Public Sector 
Ethics Act establishes an Integrity Commissioner, 74 however, there is no section 
providing for the Commissioner’s function or powers.  It merely establishes the need 
to prepare codes of conduct for public officials, and provides75that any disciplinary 
action for an approved code of conduct is to be dealt with, if the official is a public 
service officer by the Public Service Act. 
 
                                                 
73 Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 5. 
74Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 (Qld) Part 7, Division 7. 
75Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 (Qld) s 24(a). 
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 The Public Service Act provides 76grounds for discipline: ‘The employing authority 
may discipline an officer if the authority is reasonably satisfied that the officer has 
contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of this Act or a code of conduct.’ 
Section 88, the Public Service Act  provides the disciplinary action that may be taken 
as including termination of the officer’s employment; reduce the officer’s 
classification level and change the officer’s duties accordingly; transfer or redeploy 
the officer to other employment in the public service; forfeit or defer a remuneration 
increment or increase of the officer; reduce the level of the officer’s remuneration; 
impose a penalty on the officer of not more than the total of two of the officer’s 
periodic remuneration payments; direct that a penalty imposed on the officer be 
deducted from the officer’s periodic remuneration payments; reprimand the officer.’ 
The range of disciplinary action available does not address in any way the loss 
suffered by a person whose privacy information has been breached, nor does it 
provide for any suitable remedy. 
 
Similarly, under the Queensland Transport accountability regime that includes the 
Code of Conduct 200377; a Privacy Plan; and a Privacy Management Plan there is an 
absence of appropriate remedies available to the aggrieved NQDL-holder.  The Code 
of Conduct 200378 provides for ‘managing breaches of the code’ including:  
application of Queensland Transport’s Human Resources Policy & Procedure for 
Performance Improvement, and Human Resource Policy and Procedure for 
Discipline; an ‘assessment is to be made to identify the seriousness of the breach and 
the actual or possible impacts’.  The assessment does not include reporting the breach 
to the licence holder.  The penalties for a proven breach of this code range from 
reprimand through to dismissal, depending on the severity or seriousness of the 
breach and all the circumstances.  There is no avenue for external review.  Finally, 
although an ‘Integrity Commissioner’ is established under the Public Sector Ethics 
Act 1994, that statutory body has no power to review decisions made under the 
privacy plans or codes of conduct established under that Act. 
 
                                                 
76Public Service Act 1996 (Qld) s87(1)(f). 
77 Queensland Transport, Code of Conduct (2005).   
78 Ibid 3. 
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 None of the legislation, codes or plans offers any assistance with determining the 
follow matters: How does the NQDL-holder know that their information privacy has 
been breached; how will they prove the breach; and who will bear the expense of the 
litigation; who makes decisions on whether a breach has occurred; is the decision 
open to review and/or appeal; who has the burden of proving or disproving the 
breach.  A member of the public seeking to determine the law that applies with 
respect to information privacy is provided with a combination of legislation; 
administrative standards; codes of conduct; and privacy plans.  In short, a prospective 
NQDL-holder has no discernible legal rights relating to their information privacy, its 
management, review processes and enforcement.     
 
XVIII INDEPENDENT PRIVACY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
 
Under the NQDL Proposal, it is proposed79 to establish privacy oversight through the 
establishment of an ‘independent privacy management committee’ comprised of an 
‘independent chair and a balanced membership (for example, Queensland Transport, 
commercial partner, licence holders and privacy advocate)’.80  The ability of the 
proposed committee to impartially protect privacy information interests is 
compromised due to its very composition of including Queensland Transport and the 
commercial partner who are ‘interested parties’ in the NQDL Proposal.  Complaints 
made to this committee are again limited by the administrative nature of its 
establishment which means that it will be unable to provide an impartial, external 
approach to the aggrieved NQDL-holder.   
 
The NQDL Privacy Management Strategy81 has suggested a number of external 
avenues for complaint and appeal to the prospective NQDL-holder, including the 
Queensland Ombudsman and the Federal Privacy Commissioner.  There are a number 
of issues in Queensland Transport’s reliance on either avenue. 
 
                                                 
79 Queensland Transport New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 12. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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 The Ombudsman, whose powers and functions are established under the Ombudsman 
Act 2001 (Qld), is subject to limitations on what can be investigated82which includes 
certain actions of Queensland Police Service officers where disciplinary action has 
been pursued under police legislation; where an action has been pursued under 
mediation; and actions being pursued by the auditor-general.  The limitations on the 
Ombudsman may involve the very actions taken by Queensland Transport, which may 
require independent investigation.   
 
The Ombudsman’s Office already handles83 over 7000 complaints a year, of which 
5% of the existing complaints are not finalised.  Queensland Transport already ranks 
in the top five departments against which complaints are lodged.  It would be 
anticipated that in the first year of the introduction of the NQDL, if the Ombudsman’s 
Office was relied upon to deal with complaints of NQDL-holders, this office could be 
unable to deal with the additional complaints.  The use of either the Ombudsman’s 
Office or the Federal Privacy Commissioner’s office is contrary to Recommendation 
6, made by the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Privacy 
in Queensland84 , that the functions of a Queensland privacy commissioner should not 
be combined with any other office.   
 
XIX BROADER ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE NQDL PROPOSAL 
 
There are three broader issues associated with the NQDL Proposal:  The compulsory 
nature of government requiring information which may negate the ability of the 
prospective NQDL-holder to provide consent; function creep in which the NQDL 
may be used for purposes beyond maintaining a driver license register; and that the 
NQDL may become a quasi-identity card. 
 
 XX COMPULSORY NATURE OF GOVERNMENT 
REQUIRING INFORMATION 
 
                                                 
82 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) s16. 
83 Office of the Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005 – 2006) 37. 
84 Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Privacy in Queensland, 
Report no 9 (1998) 59. 
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 The use of smartcard technology by government in its statutory requisition of 
information raises fundamental issues, including: does a citizen exercise any genuine 
choice in using this technology, in contrast to a ‘consumer’ for example electing to 
take up the use of a SIM-card in their mobile phone, or electing to use a loyalty 
scheme, who both chooses to participate in the technology, and consents to the 
collection and use of their information subject to specified limitations.   
 
The proposed NQDL will include a number of points at which ‘consent’ will need to 
be expressly addressed to ensure prospective NQDL-holder’s are considered fully 
informed of the use and disclosure of their personal information to which they are 
consenting.  It is unlikely that Queensland Transport will offer a choice of 
participating in the NQDL; in fact this is the central issue of ‘consent’ with respect to 
a government organisation.  If a person wishes to drive a vehicle in Queensland then 
they must obtain a driver licence, and after 2007, the only type of driver licence will 
be a smartcard driver licence; in this regard ‘consent’ is superfluous.  However, there 
remain a number of other points at which the notion of ‘consent’ needs to be 
discussed, and obtained.   
 
Consent, for it to be consent requires a consideration of whether the consent was 
informed and voluntary.  The ALRC Discussion Paper commented on consent, 
considered account be taken of at least two ‘critical factors’:  firstly, ‘an analysis of 
the individual’s likely level of  understanding as to what he or she is consenting to, 
and the implications of giving and withholding his or her consent [and secondly] an 
analysis of whether the individual has a clear option not to consent…’85  This analysis 
would best be addressed by Queensland Transport undertaking a full privacy impact 
assessment, and publishing the results.  This would provide the prospective NQDL-
holder with a level of knowledge that related directly and independently to each 
aspect of collecting personal information; using personal information; and disclosing 
personal information in order for consent to have been provided.  The Queensland 
Transport consultation material does not refer to a privacy impact assessment having 
                                                 
85 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 (2007) 
579. 
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 been undertaken; however the Galexia website86 states that they have conducted ‘a 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of new technology being considered by Queensland 
Transport, including ongoing advice to the Department on smart cards, electronic 
authentication, digital certificates, evidence of identity, and PKI. Galexia’s PIA and 
the subsequent Privacy Management Strategy received formal sign off from the 
Queensland Crown Solicitor and approval from a Cabinet sub-committee.’87 To date, 
the privacy impact assessment has not been published. 
 
XXI FUNCTION CREEP 
 
Function creep has been defined as ‘…the tendency of systems to evolve such that 
they are used for purposes for which they were not designed, that never could have 
been envisaged at the time of system creation. … Security features, such as subject-
privacy guarantees, are immensely difficult, if not impossible, to retrofit.’ 88  
 
Queensland Transport have stated that other commercial applications be included on 
the smartcard as a means to offset smartcard technology costs.  The NQDL Proposal 
in effect envisages a secondary use of the smartcard by other government agencies, 
for example, by allowing Queensland Police Service to access the database of digital 
photographs, and the inclusion of emergency contact details that may be accessed by 
emergency service officers.  The beginning of ‘function creep’ is present in both 
instances of access to driver licence information by agencies not directly related to the 
function of maintaining a register of driver licence information.  
 
Other States proposals for the use of smartcard driver licences, are being progressed 
with the intention to ‘build in other applications’, including that of the Victorian 
Government’s A Smarter Licence for Victorians have stated in their proposal:89 ‘…the 
overall aims of this study have been to adopt a simple solution initially but build in 
                                                 
86 Galexia are specialist consultants in privacy who have been involved in providing advice on aspects 
of the NQDL project. 
87 Refer to Galexia’s website <http://www.galexia.com/public/projects/projects-QT.html#Heading78> , 
at 10 January 2008. 
88 Stand, Entitlement cards and identity fraud: Identity Card Response, 
<http://www.stand.org.uk/IdCardResponse.html> at 20 April 2006 19. 
89 VicRoads, Introducing New Driver Licence Card Technologies: A Smarter Licence for Victorians 
(2002) 22. 
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 capacity to expand to multiple applications as users become ready to accept new 
uses…’  (My emphasis)  The approach of Queensland Transport, and of VicRoads90 
to ‘add on’ applications is in contrast to the guidelines on how the privacy principles 
should be incorporated into smartcard projects, laid down by the Federal Privacy 
Commissioner.91 The guidelines required that ‘The purposes for which the card can 
be used must be settled at the beginning of the project’s development; all parties to 
the smartcard project should be identified at the beginning of the project; card holders 
must be advised before there are any changes to the smartcard system (such as the 
introduction of new features) that affect the collection and use of personal 
information; their consent – real, informed consent – must be obtained to participate 
in the new arrangements. 92   
 
The only means to protect against (or at least reduce opportunities for) ‘function 
creep’ is to legislate for the information privacy principles, particularly the principles 
with respect to collection, use and disclosure. 
 
XXII QUASI-IDENTITY CARD 
 
Another issue associated with the NQDL Proposal is that it will become a ‘quasi-
identity card’.  This is perhaps already an issue with a driver licence that is used as a 
means of identity by the commercial sector where it is regularly used to verify identity 
details in transactions such as accepting cheques. Although Queensland Transport 
does not promote the current driver licence as a means of identification, and its use in 
commercial transactions occurs independently, it will become more of an issue if 
Queensland Transport ‘strengthens’ its reliance as being an accurate means of identity 
for the driver licence purposes.  It is likely that reliance on its use by the private sector 
will also increase.    
 
XXIII  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
90 Ibid.   
91 Federal Privacy Commissioner, Smart cards: Implications for privacy, Information Paper No 4 
(1995) 3. 
92 Ibid.  The Canadian approach is to treat consent to each of these aspects – ‘collection’, ‘use’ and 
disclosure’ as distinct and separate. 
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 Technologies, including smartcards, are rapidly being developed with enormous 
capabilities to collect, use and disclose information about individuals.  Government is 
increasingly the user and purchaser of this technology as a means of gaining the 
efficiency related benefits for carrying out its functions.  As part of the balance in 
taking up these technologies, government must put in place legislative safeguards to 
protect individuals from possible costs to privacy incurred through the use of the 
technologies.   
 
The conclusion then of this article is not that the NQDL Proposal should not be 
pursued as a means of fulfilling Queensland Transport’s function to provide for 
registration and licensing of road users.  Rather, that the NQDL Proposal should be 
implemented within a framework of dedicated privacy legislation (that is, a Privacy 
Act (Qld)) that protects an individual’s information (both personal and sensitive) as a 
statutory right, rather than a principle that may be overridden by a contractual clause 
or by other legislation.  A Privacy Act (Qld) is needed to provide the following:  a 
statutory right to information privacy that at a minimum covers the IPPs; a clear right 
of legal redress for breaches of information privacy; appropriate remedies that address 
breaches; the requirement that a privacy impact assessment is to be carried out and 
published; the establishment of a privacy commissioner with the necessary functions, 
powers and resources to oversight privacy.  In short, the earlier recommendations 
made almost ten years ago by the Queensland Legal, Constitutional and 
Administrative Review Committee in its review of privacy, need to be implemented. 
 
                                                 
i Queensland Transport, New Queensland Driver Licence: Privacy Management Strategy (2003) 13. 
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